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ABSTRACT. We investigate under which conditions a transformation of an imprecise
probability model of a certain type (coherent lower previsions, n-monotone capacities,
minitive measures) produces a model of the same type. We give a number of necessary and
sufficient conditions, and study in detail a particular class of such transformations, called
filter maps. These maps include as particular models multi-valued mappings as well as other
models of interest within imprecise probability theory, and can be linked to filters of sets
and {0,1}-valued lower probabilities.
Keywords: Coherent lower previsions, n-monotone capacities, minitive measures, filters,
Choquet integral.
1. INTRODUCTION
In many practical problems, it is not uncommon to encounter situations with vague or
imprecise knowledge about the probabilistic information of the variables involved; this
could be due to deficiencies in the observational process or conflicts between the opinions of
several experts, amongst other things. In such cases, it may advisable to consider imprecise
probability models as a more robust alternative to the classical models based on probability
measures. These models include as particular cases sets of probability measures [14],
coherent lower previsions [19], n-monotone capacities [1], and necessity measures [11].
All these models are mathematically related to each other: sets of probability measures
and coherent lower previsions are equivalent, and they include n-monotone capacities as
special cases. Necessity measures are in particular n-monotone for any natural number n.
Interestingly, a transformation of such models—under a permutation of the possibility
space, or more generally, under another map that connects two possibility spaces—need
not preserve their character. To give an example, it is not uncommon that a transformation
of a necessity measure goes beyond the framework of necessity measures, and produces
only a coherent lower prevision (probability). In this paper, we investigate under which
conditions a transformation of the possibility space, or of the associated space of real-
valued functions defined on it, preserves different consistency notions: avoiding sure loss,
coherence, n-monotonicity or being minimum preserving.
We show that for the first two we must consider so-called coherence preserving trans-
formations, which are closely related to (but as the same time more general than) coherent
lower previsions. We investigate their properties in Sections 3 and 4. We show in Section 7
that as particular cases of coherence preserving mappings, we have the notion of probabil-
ity induced by a random variable, but also the Markov operators considered in [17]. For
the last two conditions, we show in Sections 5 and 6 that a conditional model preserves
n-monotonicity in addition to coherence if and only if it it is a ∧-homomorphism, i.e. mini-
mum preserving. We characterise minimum preserving coherent lower previsions, and show
that they are in a one-to-one correspondence with filters of subsets of the possibility space.
This leads us to the second part of the paper, where we study in detail a particular type
of mappings, called filter maps, which we introduce in Section 8. They are maps that assign
to any element of an initial space a filter of subsets of a final space. But they can also be
interpreted as minimum preserving transformations. We show that they include as particular
cases the lower previsions induced by multi-valued mappings as well as lower oscillation
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models, and we study the properties of the lower prevision that results from combining a
filter map with a lower prevision on the initial space.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Coherent lower previsions. We begin with a brief discussion of coherent lower
previsions. We refer to [19] for more details and background, and for the proofs of all results
mentioned in this section.
Consider a possibility spaceX . A gamble f onX is any bounded real-valued map on
X . This is for instance the case for the indicator IA of a subset A ofX , where IA(x) takes
the value 1 when x ∈ A and 0 when x /∈ A.
The set of all gambles on X is denoted by G (X ). This is a linear space: it is closed
under point-wise addition and multiplication by real numbers. It is moreover a lattice, that is,
closed under point-wise maxima ∨ and minima ∧. We will be interested in some particular
transformations between sets of gambles.
Definition 1. Given two spaces X and Y , a map r : G (X ) → G (Y ) is called a ∧-
homomorphism when r( f1∧ f2) = r( f1)∧ r( f2) for all f1, f2 ∈ G (X ).
A real-valued map defined on a set of gambles is called a lower prevision. It can be given
a behavioural interpretation: the lower prevision of a gamble f is the supremum price µ
such that the transaction f −µ is desirable for a given subject. This interpretation lies at the
basis of the following definitions:
Definition 2. A lower prevision on a set of gamblesK ⊆G (X ) is a functional P : K →R.
It is said to avoid sure loss when for every n ∈ N0 and f1, . . . , fn ∈K :
n
∑
i=1
P( fi)≤ sup
[
n
∑
i=1
fi
]
,
where N0 denotes the set of natural numbers (with zero). It is called coherent if and only if
for all numbers n,m ∈ N0 and f0, f1, . . . , fn ∈K :
n
∑
i=1
P( fi)−mP( f0)≤ sup
[
n
∑
i=1
fi−m f0
]
.
One example of coherent lower previsions are the so-called vacuous ones. For any
non-empty subset A ofX , the vacuous lower prevision relative to A is defined on G (X ) as
PA( f ) := infx∈A
f (x) for all f ∈ G (X ).
A lower prevision P on the set G (X ) of all gambles turns out to be coherent if and only
if:
C1. P( f )≥ inf f for all gambles f onX ;
C2. P(λ f ) = λP( f ) for all gambles f onX and all real λ ≥ 0;
C3. P( f +g)≥ P( f )+P(g) for all gambles f and g onX .
On the other hand, a coherent lower prevision defined on indicators of events only is
called a coherent lower probability. To simplify the notation, we will sometimes use the
same symbol A to denote a set A and its indicator IA, so we will write P(A) instead of P(IA).
Of particular interest are the {0,1}-valued coherent lower probabilities, which are related to
filters of events:
Definition 3. Let P(X ) denote the power set of a space X . A subset F of P(X ) is
called a (proper) filter when it satisfies the following properties:
F1. /0 /∈F ;
F2. if A,B ∈F then A∩B ∈F ;
F3. if A ∈F and A⊆ B then B ∈F .
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A filter F is called fixed1 if there is a non-empty subset A ofX such that B ∈F if and
only if A⊆ B, and it is called free otherwise.
If P is a coherent lower probability onP(X ) that takes only the values 0 and 1, then
the class {A⊆X : P(A) = 1} forms a filter; and, conversely, for any filterF ofP(X ),
the lower probability P given by P(A) = 1 if A belongs toF , and 0 otherwise, is coherent.
We denote by F(X ) the set of all filters over the spaceX .
If a lower prevision P avoids sure loss, then we can ‘correct’ it into a coherent lower pre-
vision. This is done by means of the procedure of natural extension, whose main properties
are summarised in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. [19] Let P be a lower prevision with domainK that avoids sure loss. Let EP
be the lower prevision on the set G (X ) of all gambles given by
EP( f ) := sup
{
µ ∈ R : f −µ ≥
n
∑
j=1
λ j( f j−P( f j)) for some n ∈ N,λ j > 0, f j ∈K
}
,
(1)
where N is the set of natural numbers (without zero).
(i) EP is a coherent lower prevision.
(ii) EP is the smallest coherent lower prevision that satisfies EP( f )≥ P( f ) for all f ∈K .
(iii) P is coherent if and only if EP( f ) = P( f ) for all f ∈K .
Another particular case of coherent lower previsions with domain G (X ) are the linear
previsions:
Definition 4. A lower prevision P defined on the set G (X ) of all gambles is called a
linear prevision when it satisfies P( f +g) = P( f )+P(g) for every pair of gambles f ,g, and
moreover P( f )≥ inf f for every gamble f .
A linear prevision coincides with the expectation functional associated with its restriction
to (indicators of) events, which is a finitely additive probability. Moreover, a lower prevision
P defined on the set G (X ) of all gambles is coherent if and only if
P( f ) = min{P( f ) : P ∈M(P)} , (2)
where
M(P) := {P≥ P : P linear prevision}
is the credal set associated with P. In other words, a coherent lower prevision P is always
the lower envelope of the set M(P) of all linear previsions that dominate it, and as such it
can be seen as a lower expectation functional. Moreover, a lower prevision P with domain
K avoids sure loss if and only if M(P) 6= /0, and in that case its natural extension EP can
be obtained by taking the lower envelope of M(P):
EP( f ) = min{P( f ) : P ∈M(P)} , (3)
and M(P) =M(EP).
In particular, the vacuous lower prevision relative to a set A is the lower envelope of the
set of linear previsions P that assign probability 1 to A:
PA( f ) = min{P( f ) : P(A) = 1 and P linear prevision} , (4)
and M(PA) = {P linear prevision : P(A) = 1}.
1Sometimes fixed filters are called principal or degenerate.
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2.2. n-Monotone lower previsions. A particular case of coherent lower previsions are
those called n-monotone:
Definition 5. Let n ∈ N. A lower prevision defined on the set G (X ) of all gambles is
n-monotone if for all p ∈ N, p≤ n, and all f , f1, . . . , fp in G (X ):
∑
I⊆{1,...,p}
(−1)|I|P
(
f ∧
∧
i∈I
fi
)
≥ 0,
where, as before, ∧ is used to denote the point-wise minimum.
n-monotone lower previsions have been studied in detail in [8, 18], to which we refer for
more details and background, and for the proofs of all results mentioned in this section.
When n ≥ 2, an n-monotone lower prevision P is in particular coherent provided that
P(0) = 0 and P(1) = 1, and it corresponds to the Choquet integral with respect to its
restriction to events, which is called an n-monotone lower probability. A lower prevision
that is n-monotone for all natural n is called ∞-monotone or completely monotone. This
is for instance the case for the vacuous lower prevision PA considered above, and more
generally for all minimum or infimum preserving lower previsions:
Definition 6. A lower prevision defined on the set G (X ) of all gambles is minitive when
P( f ∧g) = P( f )∧P(g) for every pair of gambles f ,g onX , and infimum preserving when
P(∧i∈I fi) = ∧i∈IP( fi) for any non-empty family { fi : i ∈ I} of gambles onX . Similarly,
a lower probability on P(X ) is called minitive when P(A∩B) = min{P(A),P(B)} for
all A,B ⊆X , and a necessity measure when P(∩i∈IAi) = infi∈I P(Ai) for any non-empty
family {Ai : i ∈ I} of subsets ofX .
Any linear prevision P on G (X ) is always completely monotone, but it need not be
minitive.
2.3. Conditional lower previsions. We may also consider lower previsions in a condi-
tional context. Within the framework of this paper, we consider two spacesX and Y , and
call conditional lower prevision any functional P(·|Y ) defined on G (X ×Y ) that to any
gamble f onX ×Y assigns a gamble P( f |Y ) on Y , where the value that P( f |Y ) assumes
in y ∈ Y is denoted by P( f |y) and called the conditional lower prevision of f given that
Y = y.
Definition 7. A conditional lower prevision P(·|Y ) on G (X ×Y ) is called separately
coherent when it satisfies the following conditions:
SC1. P( f |y)≥ infx∈X f (x,y),
SC2. P(λ f |y) = λP( f |y),
SC3. P( f +g|y)≥ P( f |y)+P(g|y),
for any gambles f ,g ∈ G (X ×Y ), all real λ ≥ 0 and all y ∈ Y .
If P(·|Y ) is a separately coherent conditional lower prevision on G (X ×Y ) and P
is a coherent lower prevision on G (Y ), their marginal extension is the coherent lower
prevision on G (X ×Y ) given by P(P(·|Y )). It corresponds to the smallest lower prevision
on G (X ×Y ) that is coherent with both P and P(·|Y ), in the sense considered in [19].
Marginal extension generalises the Law of Total Probability to lower previsions.
3. COHERENCE PRESERVING TRANSFORMATIONS
In this section, we investigate how to transform a lower prevision on some set of gambles
over a space Y into a lower prevision on gambles defined on another spaceX while still
keeping most of its properties.
Definition 8. Let T : G (X )→ G (Y ) be a transformation between two sets of gambles. It
is called coherence preserving when it satisfies the following properties:
LOWER PREVISIONS INDUCED BY FILTER MAPS 5
T1. inf(T f )≥ inf f for all f ∈ G (X );
T2. T (λ f ) = λT f for all f ∈ G (X ) and all real λ ≥ 0;
T3. T ( f +g)≥ T f +T g for all f ,g ∈ G (X ).
A coherence preserving transformation T automatically satisfies the following properties:
T4. if f ≤ g then T f ≤ T g for all f ,g ∈ G (X );
T5. T ( f +µ) = T f +µ for all f ∈ G (X ) and all real µ .
The interest of this type of transformations lies in the following result:
Proposition 2. Let T : G (X )→ G (Y ) be a transformation between two sets of gambles.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) T is coherence preserving;
(ii) for every coherent lower prevision P on G (Y ), the composition P◦T is a coherent
lower prevision on G (X ).
Moreover, if T is coherence preserving, and the lower prevision P on G (Y ) avoids sure
loss, then the lower prevision P◦T on G (X ) avoids sure loss as well.
Proof. Let us begin the proof of the equivalence by showing that the first statement implies
the second. It suffices to prove that P◦T satisfies conditions C1–C3.
C1. For any gamble f in G (X ), (P ◦T )( f ) = P(T f ) ≥ P(infT f ) ≥ P(inf f ) = inf f ,
where the first inequality follows from the coherence of P and the second from T1.
C2. Given f in G (X ) and λ > 0, P(T (λ f )) = P(λT f ) = λP(T f ), where the first
equality follows from T2 and the second from the coherence of P.
C3. Given f ,g ∈ G (X ), P(T ( f +g))≥ P(T f +T g)≥ P(T f )+P(T g), where the first
inequality follows from T3 and the second from the coherence of P.
Conversely, assume that the second statement holds, consider any y ∈ Y , and take the
degenerate linear prevision P{y}, given by P{y}(g) := g(y) for all gambles g on Y . Then
P{y} ◦T is a coherent lower prevision by assumption, and (P{y} ◦T )( f ) = (T f )(y). Let us
use this to show that T satisfies T1–T3.
T1. Since P{y} ◦T is a coherent lower prevision for all y ∈ Y , we infer from C1 that
inf f ≤ (P{y} ◦T )( f ) = (T f )(y), whence indeed inf(T f )≥ inf f , for any gamble f onX .
T2. Since P{y} ◦T is a coherent lower prevision for all y ∈ Y , we infer from C2 that
(T (λ f ))(y)= (P{y}◦T )(λ f )= λ (P{y}◦T )( f )= λ (T f )(y), whence indeed T (λ f )= λT f ,
for any gamble f onX and any real λ ≥ 0.
T3. Since P{y} ◦T is a coherent lower prevision for all y ∈ Y , we infer from C3 that
(T ( f + g))(y) = (P{y} ◦T )( f + g) ≥ (P{y} ◦T )( f )+ (P{y} ◦T )(g) = (T f )(y)+ (T g))(y),
whence indeed T ( f +g)≥ T f +T g, for all gambles f and g onX .
To complete the proof, assume that T is coherence preserving and consider a lower
prevision P on G (Y ) that avoids sure loss. Then there is a linear prevision P on G (Y ) such
that P≥ P. As a consequence, P◦T ≥ P◦T , and we have just proved that P◦T is a coherent
lower prevision, which is in therefore in particular dominated by some linear prevision. This
implies that P◦T is dominated by some linear prevision, and as a consequence it avoids
sure loss. 
A transformation T takes any ‘vector’ f in the linear space G (X ) to a ‘vector’ T f in
the linear space G (Y ), whose ‘components’ are the real numbers (T f )(y), y ∈ Y . This
also means that we can interpret T as a ‘vector map’ with as ‘component maps’ the real
functionals T y : G (X )→ R, y ∈ Y , defined by
T y( f ) := (T f )(y) = (P{y} ◦T )(y) for all f ∈ G (X ). (5)
We infer at once from our argumentation in the proof of Proposition 2 that:
Proposition 3. A transformation T : G (X )→ G (Y ) is coherence preserving if and only if
each of its component maps T y = P{y} ◦T , y ∈ Y is a coherent lower prevision on G (X ).
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In other words, a coherence preserving transformation T : G (X )→ G (Y ) can be seen as
a family T y, y ∈ Y of coherent lower previsions on G (X ).
We can use this simple idea to prove a number of basic properties for coherence pre-
serving transformations. The first one is an envelope result akin to the one mentioned for
coherent lower previsions in Eq. (2):
Proposition 4. A transformation T : G (X )→ G (Y ) is coherence preserving if and only
if it is the component-wise lower envelope of a set of coherence preserving linear transfor-
mations.
Proof. ‘only if’. Let T be a coherence preserving transformation. Then for every y ∈ Y
the lower prevision T y defined by Eq. (5) is coherent. As a consequence, it is the lower
envelope of the set of linear previsions M(T y). Define now the setH of transformations
H :=
{
T : G (X )→ G (Y ) : (∀y ∈ Y )Ty ∈M(T y)
}
,
then obviously T is the component-wise lower envelope ofH . From Proposition 3, any
T ∈H is a coherence preserving transformation, because its associated component maps
are linear previsions, and therefore in particular coherent lower previsions. To see that T is
a linear transformation, note that for any f ,g ∈ G (X ) and all y ∈ Y :
T ( f +g)(y) = Ty( f +g) = Ty f +Tyg = (T f +T g)(y),
and therefore T ( f +g) = T f +T g.
‘if’. That T is a component-wise lower envelope of coherence preserving linear trans-
formations means that for every y ∈ Y the lower prevision T y defined by Eq. (5) is a
lower envelope of linear previsions, and is therefore a coherent lower prevision. Now use
Proposition 3. 
Next, we show that a number of combinations of coherence-preserving transformations
produce another coherence-preserving transformation.
Proposition 5. (i) Let {T i : i ∈ I} be a family of coherence preserving transformations,
and let T := infi∈I T i be their component-wise lower envelope. Then T is coherence
preserving.
(ii) Let T n be a sequence of coherence preserving transformations that converges point-
wise towards some T : G (X )→ G (Y ). Then T is coherence preserving.
(iii) Let T 1 and T 2 be coherence preserving transformations and let α ∈ (0,1). Then
T := αT 1+(1−α)T 2 is coherence preserving.
Proof. Taking into account Proposition 3, it suffices to establish the corresponding properties
for the coherent component maps. These have been proved in [19, Theorems 2.6.3–2.6.5].

In a similar vein, and taking into account the characterisation of coherence-preserving
functionals in Proposition 3, we can extend most of the properties established for coherent
lower previsions in [19, Section 2] to coherence-preserving functionals.
4. COHERENCE PRESERVING TRANSFORMATIONS AND CONDITIONAL LOWER
PREVISIONS
Consider a coherence preserving transformation T : G (X )→ G (Y ). We have seen in
Proposition 3 that its component maps T y are coherent lower previsions, and it follows from
the discussion in Section 2.3 that if we let
P(h|y) = P(h(·,y)|y) := T y(h(·,y)) = (T h(·,y))(y) for all y ∈ Y and h ∈ G (X ×Y ),
(6)
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then P(·|Y ) is a conditional lower prevision on G (X ×Y ) that is separately coherent.
Conversely, with a separately coherent conditional lower prevision P(·|Y ) on G (X ×Y ),
we can associate a transformation T defined by
(T f )(y) := P( f |y) for all y ∈ Y and f ∈ G (X ) (7)
that is coherence preserving. In other words, Proposition 3 can be reformulated to state that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between coherence preserving transformations and
separately coherent conditional lower previsions, expressed by Eqs. (6) and (7).
Interestingly, if we have a coherent lower prevision P on G (Y ), and a coherent preserving
transformation T : G (X )→ G (Y ) with associated conditional lower prevision P(·|Y ) via
Eq. (6), then the transformed coherent lower prevision P◦T = P(P(·|Y )) is the marginal
extension of P and P(·|Y ), as discussed in Section 2.3.
This correspondence points towards an interesting way of extending a transformation
T : G (X )→ G (Y ) to a transformation T˜ : G (X ×Y )→ G (Y ), defined by
(T˜ h)(y) := (T h(·,y))(y) for all y ∈ Y and h ∈ G (X ×Y ). (8)
This simple idea will turn out to be of crucial importance for the discussion further on.
5. ∧-HOMOMORPHISMS
Before we turn to the study of n-monotonicity, let us take a look at the transformations
that preserve minitivity.
Proposition 6. Let T : G (X )→ G (Y ) be a transformation between two sets of gambles.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) T is a ∧-homomorphism;
(ii) for every minitive lower prevision P on G (Y ), the composition P◦T is a minitive
lower prevision on G (X ).
Proof. Let us begin the proof of the equivalence by showing that the first statement implies
the second. Given f ,g ∈ G (X ) and a minitive P, we have indeed that P(T ( f ∧ g)) =
P(T f ∧T g) = P(T f )∧P(T g), so P◦T is minitive too.
Conversely, assume that the second statement holds, consider any y ∈ Y , and consider
the degenerate linear prevision P{y}, given by P{y}(g) := g(y) for all gambles g on Y . It is
clearly minitive, and therefore its component map T y = P{y} ◦T is minitive by assumption.
Hence T ( f ∧ g)(y) = T y( f ∧ g) = T y f ∧ T yg, and therefore T ( f ∧ g) = T f ∧ T g for all
gambles f and g on G (X ), so T is a ∧-homomorphism. 
The argumentation in this proof leads at once to the following proposition:
Proposition 7. A transformation T : G (X )→ G (Y ) is a ∧-homomorphism if and only if
each of its component maps T y = P{y} ◦T , y ∈ Y is a minitive lower prevision on G (X ).
Because minitive lower previsions are completely monotone, they are also coherent if
and only if they satisfy P(0) = 0 and P(1) = 1. The following result provides a further
characterisation.
Theorem 8. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on G (X ). Then the following statements
are equivalent:
(i) P is minitive;
(ii) the restriction of P to events is a {0,1}-valued lower probability;
(iii) there is a filterF := {A⊆X : P(A) = 1} such that P( f ) = supF∈F infx∈F f (x) for
all gambles f onX .
Proof. We begin by showing that the first statement implies the second. Assume that P is a
minitive coherent lower prevision. Then it follows that its restriction to events is a minitive
lower probability. Assume ex absurdo that there is some event A such that P(A) ∈ (0,1).
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Consider the gambles f := 1 and g := 2P(A) IA. Then P( f ) = 1 and P(g) =
2
P(A)P(A) = 2, so
P( f )∧P(g) = 1. On the other hand, f ∧g = IA, so P( f ∧g) = P(A)< 1. This contradicts
that P is minitive.
To show that the second statement implies the third, assume that the restriction Q of P to
events is a {0,1}-valued lower probability onP(X ), which is coherent as a restriction of
the coherent lower prevision P. It then follows from the discussion in [19, Sections 2.9.8
and 3.2.6] that the setF := {A⊆X : P(A) = 1} is a (proper) filter, and that Q has a unique
coherent extension to G (X )—which must therefore coincide with P—given by:
P( f ) = sup
F∈F
inf
x∈F
f (x) for all gambles f onX . (9)
Finally, to show that the third statement implies the first, we must prove that the lower
prevision P defined by Eq. (9) is minitive. Consider any two gambles f and g onX . Then for
any ε > 0 there are two events F1 and F2 inF such that P( f )≤ infx∈F1 f (x)+ε and P(g)≤
infx∈F2 g(x)+ε , and therefore also P( f )≤ infx∈F1∩F2 f (x)+ε and P(g)≤ infx∈F1∩F2 g(x)+ε .
SinceF is a filter, we deduce that F1∩F2 ∈F and therefore
P( f ∧g)≥ inf
x∈F1∩F2
( f ∧g)(x) = inf
x∈F1∩F2
f (x)∧ inf
x∈F1∩F2
g(x)
≥ (P( f )− ε)∧ (P(g)− ε)≥ (P( f )∧P(g))− ε.
We deduce that P( f ∧g)≥ P( f )∧P(g). The converse inequality follows from the mono-
tonicity (due to coherence) of P. 
We deduce from Theorem 8 that there is a one-to-one correspondence between filters
of subsets ofX and minitive coherent lower previsions. If in addition we require that the
lower prevision should be infimum preserving, we have the following result:
Theorem 9 ([2, Section 8]). Let P be a coherent lower prevision on G (X ). Then P
is infimum preserving if and only if its restriction to events is a {0,1}-valued necessity
measure.
Taking into account the discussion above, we deduce that an infimum preserving coherent
lower prevision P is also associated with a filterF of subsets of A ; but since P is infimum
and not just minimum preserving, it follows that
P
(⋂
F
)
= inf
A∈F
P(A) = 1,
and as a consequence there is a smallest subset
⋂
F of X with lower probability 1, so⋂
F ∈F , meaning thatF is fixed. This shows that infimum preserving coherent lower
previsions are those associated with fixed filters, while more generally minitive coherent
lower previsions can also be associated with a free filter. It also shows that the only infimum
preserving coherent lower previsions are the vacuous lower previsions we have introduced
in Section 2. Finally, when X is finite, the properties of being infimum preserving and
minimum preserving are equivalent, because in that case all filters are fixed; hence, in that
case the vacuous lower previsions are the only minimum preserving ones.
6. n-MONOTONICITY PRESERVING TRANSFORMATIONS
From transformations that preserve coherence, and transformations that preserve minitiv-
ity, we now turn to the study of transformations that preserve n-monotonicity. We begin by
showing that a coherence preserving transformation does not preserve n-monotonicity in
general:
Example 1. Let P be a coherent lower prevision onX that is not n-monotone. Consider the
coherence preserving transformation T defined by (T f )(y) := P( f ) for all f ∈ G (X ) and
all y ∈ Y . Then for any n-monotone lower prevision Q on G (Y ), Q◦T coincides with P,
which is not n-monotone.
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The second type of transformations we have studied so far are the ∧-homomorphisms we
have characterised in Section 5. It is not difficult to show that this type of transformations
do preserve n-monotonicity:
Proposition 10 ([8, Lemma 6]). Let T : G (X )→ G (Y ) be a ∧-homomorphism and let P
be a lower prevision on G (Y ). If P is n-monotone, then P◦T is n-monotone too.
Our next example shows that being a ∧-homomorphism, although sufficient, is not
necessary for a coherence preserving transformation to preserve n-monotonicity:
Example 2. Let P be an n-monotone lower prevision onX that is not minitive. Consider the
coherence preserving transformation T defined by (T f )(y) := P( f ) for all f ∈ G (X ) and
all y ∈Y . Then for any n-monotone lower prevision Q on G (Y ), Q◦T = P is n-monotone,
so T preserves n-monotonicity, but it is not a ∧-homomorphism, because its component
maps T y = P are not minitive; see Proposition 6.
Nevertheless, it is possible, with some modifications, to prove a characterisation of
transformations that preserve n-monotonicity as ∧-homomorphisms. For this we need to
look at the extended transformations T˜ : G (X ×Y )→ G (Y ) that can be used to turn a
lower prevision P on G (Y ) into a lower prevision P◦ T˜ on G (X ×Y ), and that are given
by Eq. (8). We begin with some basic observations:
Proposition 11. Let T be a coherence preserving transformation between G (X ) and
G (Y ).
(i) If P avoids sure loss, then so does P◦ T˜ .
(ii) If P is coherent, then so is P◦ T˜ .
(iii) If P is n-monotone and T is a ∧-homomorphism, then P◦ T˜ is n-monotone as well.
(iv) If P is minitive and T is a ∧-homomorphism, then P◦ T˜ is minitive as well.
Proof. If we consider that T˜ is a transformation between G (X ×Y ) and G (Y ), we can
consider its component maps T˜ y, which are the lower previsions on G (X ×Y ) given by:
T˜ y(h) = (T˜ h)(y) = (T h(·,y))(y) = T yh(·,y) for all gambles h onX ×Y and all y ∈ Y .
This shows, taking into account Propositions 3 and 7, that T˜ is coherence preserving if T
is, and that T˜ is a ∧-homomorphism if T is. Now invoke Proposition 2 for the first two
statements, Proposition 10 for the third, and Proposition 6 for the fourth. 
We can show that a transformation T˜ preserves n-monotonicity if and only if T is a
∧-homomorphism:
Proposition 12. Let T : G (X )→ G (Y ) be a transformation between two sets of gambles.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) T is a ∧-homomorphism;
(ii) for every n-monotone lower prevision P on G (Y ), the composition P ◦ T˜ is an n-
monotone lower prevision on G (X ×Y ).
Proof. The direct implication follows from Proposition 11.
To prove the converse implication, assume that for every n-monotone lower prevision P
on G (Y ), the composition P◦ T˜ is an n-monotone lower prevision on G (X ×Y ).
We first prove that then T y must be monotone for every y ∈ Y . Assume ex absurdo
that there are yo ∈ Y and gambles f ≤ g onX such that T yo f = T f (yo)> T g(yo) = T yog.
This means that with P := P{yo}—the completely monotone vacuous lower prevision on
G (Y ) relative to {yo}—the composition P◦ T˜ is not completely monotone, because it is
not even monotone: if we define the gambles f˜ ≤ g˜ onX ×Y by letting f˜ (x,y) := f (x)
and g˜(x,y) := g(x) for all x ∈X and y ∈ Y , then T˜ y f˜ = (T f˜ (·,y))(y) = T f (y) = T y f and
similarly T˜ yg˜ = T yg, which leads to the contradiction:
(P◦ T˜ )( f˜ ) = T yo( f )> T yo(g) = (P◦ T˜ )(g˜).
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Next, assume ex absurdo that T is not a ∧-homomorphism, then there is, by Proposition 7,
some y ∈ Y such that T y is not minitive. Then there are gambles f1 and f2 onX such that
T y( f1∧ f2)< T y f1∧T y f2, since the monotonicity of T y already implies that T y( f1∧ f2)≤
T y f1∧T y f2.
Consider any y′ 6= y, and the vacuous lower prevision P{y,y′} relative to {y,y′}, which
is a completely monotone coherent lower prevision on G (Y ). We only need to show
that P{y,y′} ◦ T˜ is not 2-monotone. Consider any real number a in the non-empty interval
(T y( f1 ∧ f2),T y f1) and any real number b in the non-empty interval (T y( f1 ∧ f2),T y f2),
and define the gambles f ,g onX ×Y by:
f := aI{y′}+ f1I{y} and g := bI{y′}+ f2I{y}.
Then
T˜ f (z) = T f (·,z) =

T y f1 z = y
a z = y′
0 elsewhere
and T˜ g(z) = T g(·,z) =

T y f2 z = y
b z = y′
0 elsewhere,
and similarly
T˜ ( f ∧g)(z) =

T y( f1∧ f2) z = y
a∧b z = y′
0 elsewhere
and T˜ ( f ∨g)(z) =

T y( f1∨ f2) z = y
a∨b z = y′
0 elsewhere,
so
(P{y,y′} ◦ T˜ )( f ) = min{a,T y f1}= a
(P{y,y′} ◦ T˜ )(g) = min{b,T y f2}= b
(P{y,y′} ◦ T˜ )( f ∧g) = min{a∧b,T y( f1∧ f2)}= T y( f1∧ f2)< a∧b
(P{y,y′} ◦ T˜ )( f ∨g) = min{a∨b,T y( f1∨ f2)}= a∨b,
taking into account that
a > T y( f1∧ f2), b > T y( f1∧ f2)⇒ a∧b > T y( f1∧ f2) and
a < T y f1, b < T y f2⇒ a∨b < T y f1∨T y f2 ≤ T y( f1∨ f2).
As a consequence,
(P{y,y′} ◦ T˜ )( f ∨g)+(P{y,y′} ◦ T˜ )( f ∧g)< (a∨b)+(a∧b) = a+b
= (P{y,y′} ◦ T˜ )( f )+(P{y,y′} ◦ T˜ )(g),
and this implies that P{y,y′} ◦ T˜ is not 2-monotone. 
We want to stress that, although the only T˜ that always preserve n-monotonicity are those
for which T is a ∧-homomorphism, it does not hold that T preserves n-monotonicity if and
only if it is a ∧-homomorphism, as we have already seen in Example 2. This is because when
T is a ∧-homomorphism between G (X ) and G (Y ) then T˜ is also a ∧-homomorphism
between G (X ×Y ) and G (Y ), but the converse is not necessarily true.
7. EXAMPLES
In this section, we discuss a number of particular cases of coherence preserving transfor-
mations.
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7.1. Liftings. Consider a map t : Y →X and its associated lifting T : G (X )→ G (Y )
given by T ( f ) := f ◦t for gambles f onX . Then T is a coherence preserving transformation,
which moreover satisfies T3 with equality, and given y ∈ Y , the component map T y of T ,
given by Eq. (5), is the degenerate linear prevision P{t(y)}.
In the special case that Y =X , the relationship between a coherent lower prevision P
and its transformation P◦T lies at the basis of the notions of weak and strong invariance
discussed in [5]. Two particular cases are of interest: the shift transformations, leading to
a treatment of time-invariance, where X = N and t(n) := n+ 1 ([5, Section 8] and [19,
Section 2.9.5]); and the permutations of a finite spaceX that give rise to a discussion of
exchangeable lower previsions ([7] and [19, Section 9.5]).
The lower prevision induced by a lifting transformation can be seen as a generalisation
to an imprecise-probabilistic context to the notion of probability induced by a map. In this
sense, these notions also lead to the convergence in distribution results for coherent lower
previsions in [7, Theorem 6].
7.2. Transition operators. In a series of papers on the dynamics of Markov chains in
an imprecise probability context [3, 4, 12], De Cooman et al. introduce and study lower
transition operators T : G (X )→ G (X ), which are, essentially, coherence preserving trans-
formations between the set G (X ) of all gambles on a finite state space X of a Markov
chain and itself. These operators are the imprecise-probabilistic counterparts of transi-
tion matrices, and they allow for a complete characterisation of the dynamical behaviour
of a Markov chain with imprecise transition probabilities. They are defined as follows:
T f (x) := P( f |x) is the conditional lower prevision of a gamble f (Xn+1) on the state Xn+1
at time n+1, when the Markov chain is on state Xn = x at time n.
We deduce from Section 4 that these transition operators can be seen as coherence
preserving transformations, and from Section 6 that they preserve n-monotonicity when
they are minitive.
7.3. Markov operators. In [17], Sˇkulj defines the following operators, which generalise
conditional (linear) expectations:
Definition 9 ([17, Definition 1]). LetH ,K be two linear subspaces of G (X ) that include
all constant gambles. A linear operator T : H →K that is monotone [ f ≤ g⇒ T ( f )≤
T (g)] and such that T (1) = 1 is called a Markov operator.
Sˇkulj discusses how to model risk and uncertainty aversion in a context of imprecision
by means of a notion of invariance with respect to a set of Markov operators. When
H = K = G (X ), a Markov operator is a particular case of a coherence preserving
transformation: T2 and T3 hold because T is a linear operator. With respect to T1, note that
for any gamble f ∈ G (X ), T ( f )≥ T (inf f ) = inf f , where the inequality follows from the
monotonicity of T and the equality from its linearity and the fact that T (1) = 1.
7.4. Multi-valued maps. Let Γ : Y →P(X ) be a multi-valued map, and use it to define
the transformation T : G (X )→ G (Y ) by T f (y) := infx∈Γ(y) f (x). This transformation is
coherence preserving, because its associated component maps T y are the vacuous lower
previsions relative to the sets Γ(y), which are in particular coherent and infimum preserving:
they are associated with the fixed filters determined by the sets Γ(y).
These types of coherence preserving transformations were investigated in detail in [16],
and will be generalised by the filter maps we will introduce in Section 8. We can identify T
with a conditional lower prevision P(·|Y ), in such a way that each P(·|y) is the vacuous lower
prevision relative to Γ(y). Taking into account Proposition 11, we see that the composition
of this coherence preserving transformation with a coherent lower prevision is again a
coherent lower prevision. In fact, since T is a ∧-homomorphism, the same result shows that
this coherence preserving transformation preserves n-monotonicity too.
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This approach allows us to generalise some of the main concepts from random set theory
to a context of imprecise-probabilistic information about the initial probability space Y .
In Section 8, we will see that this generalisation can be taken one step further by means of
filter maps.
8. FILTER MAPS
When we combine the results of Propositions 7 and 12 with Theorem 8, we see that
the transformations T that are guaranteed to preserve n-monotonicity are the ones whose
component maps T y are minitive coherent lower previsions, meaning that there is some
filter Φ(y) of subsets ofX such that
T yh = sup
F∈Φ(y)
inf
x∈F
h(x,y) for all gambles h onX ×Y .
In this section, we study these transformations in some detail. But we begin by providing
yet another way of motivating their study.
8.1. Motivation. Consider two variables X and Y assuming values in the non-empty (but
not necessarily finite) setsX and Y .
Let us first look at a single-valued map γ between the spaces Y and X . Given a
linear prevision P on G (Y ), such a map induces a precise probability Pγ on G (X ) by
Pγ(A) := P(γ−1(A)) = P({y ∈ Y : γ(y) ∈ A}) for all A⊆X , or equivalently
Pγ( f ) := P( f ◦ γ) for all gambles f onX , (10)
which is a well-known ‘change of variables result’ for previsions (or expectations): If we
have a variable Y , and the variable X is given by X := γ(Y ), then any gamble f (X) on the
value of X can be translated back to a gamble f (γ(Y )) = ( f ◦γ)(Y ) on the value of Y , which
explains where Eq. (10) comes from: if the uncertainty about Y is represented by the model
P, then the uncertainty about X = γ(Y ) is represented by Pγ . This can also be seen as an
application of the lifting procedure from Section 7.1.
There is another way of motivating the same formula, which lends itself more readily
to generalisation. We can interpret the map γ as conditional information: if we know that
Y = y, then we know that X = γ(y). This conditional information can be represented by a
so-called conditional linear prevision P(·|Y ) on G (X ), defined by
P( f |y) := f (γ(y)) = ( f ◦ γ)(y) for all gambles f onX . (11)
It states that conditional on Y = y, all probability mass for X is located in the single
point γ(y). If P( f |Y ) is the gamble on Y that assumes the value P( f |y) in y, then clearly
P( f |Y ) = ( f ◦ γ)(Y ), which allows us to rewrite Eq. (10) as:
Pγ( f ) = P(P( f |Y )) for all gambles f onX , (12)
which shows that Eq. (10) is actually a special case of the Law of Iterated Expectations, the
expectation form of the Law of Total Probability, in classical probability (see, for instance,
[9, Theorem 4.7.1]).
Assume now that, more generally, the relation between X and Y is determined as follows.
There is a so-called multi-valued map Γ : Y →P(X ) that associates with any y ∈ Y a
non-empty subset Γ(y) ofX , and if we know that Y = y, then all we know about X is that
it can assume any value in Γ(y). There is no immediately obvious way of representing this
conditional information using a precise probability model. If we want to remain within the
framework of precise probability theory, we must abandon the simple and powerful device
of interpreting the multi-valued map Γ as conditional information. But if we work with
the theory of imprecise probabilities, as we are doing here, it is still perfectly possible to
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interpret Γ as conditional information that can be represented by a special conditional lower
prevision P(·|Y ) on G (X ), where
P( f |y) = PΓ(y)( f ) = inf
x∈Γ(y)
f (x) for all gambles f onX (13)
is the vacuous lower prevision relative to the event Γ(y); see Section 7.4 for more details.
Given information about Y in the form of a coherent lower prevision P on G (Y ), it follows
from Walley’s Marginal Extension Theorem (see [19, Section 6.7]) that the corresponding
information about X is the lower prevision PΓ on G (X ) defined by
PΓ( f ) = P(P( f |Y )) for all gambles f onX , (14)
which is an immediate generalisation of Eq. (12). This formula provides a well-justified
method for using the conditional information embodied in the multi-valued map Γ to turn
the uncertainty model P about Y into an uncertainty model PΓ about X . This approach has
been introduced and explored in great detail by Miranda et al. [16].
What we intend to do here, is take this idea of conditional information one useful step
further. To motivate going even further that multi-valued maps, assume that the information
about the relation between X and Y is the following: If we know that Y = y, then all we
know about X is that it lies arbitrarily close to γ(y), in the sense that X lies inside any
neighbourhood of γ(x). We are assuming that, in order to capture what ‘arbitrarily close’
means, we have providedX with a topology T of open sets. We can model this type of
conditional information using the conditional lower prevision P(·|Y ) on G (X ), where
P( f |y) = PNγ(y)( f ) = sup
N∈Nγ(y)
inf
x∈N
f (x) for all gambles f onX (15)
is the lower prevision associated with the neighbourhood filterNγ(y) of γ(y). Information
about Y in the form of a coherent lower prevision P on G (Y ) can now be turned into
information P(P(·|Y )) about X , via this conditional model, using Eq. (14). This is the idea
behind the notion of filter maps we define next.
8.2. Definition and main properties. So, given this motivation, let us try and capture
these ideas in an abstract model.
Definition 10. A filter map Φ from Y to X , is a map Φ : Y → F(X ) that associates a
proper2 filter Φ(y) with each element y of Y .
We can use filter maps to model some type of conditional information, which can be
represented by a (specific) conditional lower prevision. In order to do this, given a filter map
Φ, we associate with any gamble f onX ×Y a lower inverse f◦ (under Φ), which is the
gamble on Y defined by
f◦(y) = PΦ(y)( f (·,y)) = sup
F∈Φ(y)
inf
x∈F
f (x,y) for all y in Y , (16)
where, of course, PΦ(y) is the lower prevision on G (X ) associated with the filter Φ(y) of
X . Let us check that this lower prevision is coherent:
Proposition 13. The lower prevision PΦ(y) on G (X ) associated with the filter Φ(y) ofX
is coherent.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 8, taking into account the one-to-one
correspondence between filters and minitive coherent lower previsions. 
2Although in this paper we are only dealing with proper filters—i.e. we assume that /0 /∈ Φ(y)—, it is also
possible to manage without this and similar assumptions, following the ideas out in [16, Technical Remarks 1
and 2].
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Similarly, we define for any gamble g onX its lower inverse g• (under Φ) as the gamble
on Y defined by
g•(y) = PΦ(y)(g) = sup
F∈Φ(y)
inf
x∈F
g(x) for all y in Y . (17)
Eqs. (16) and (17) are obviously very closely related to, and inspired by, the expressions (11),
(13) and (15). In particular, we find for any A⊆X ×Y that (IA)◦ = IA◦ , where we let
A◦ = {y ∈ Y : (∃F ∈Φ(y))F×{y} ⊆ A}
denote the so-called lower inverse of A (under Φ). And if B⊆X , then
(B×Y )◦ = B• = {y ∈ Y : (∃F ∈Φ(y))F ⊆ B} ,
is the set of all y for which B occurs eventually with respect to the filter Φ(y).
If we consider the transformation T : G (X )→G (Y )with component maps T y :=PΦ(y),
then f◦ = T˜ f for any gamble f on X ×Y , and g• = T g for any gamble g on X . We
know from the discussion in the previous sections that T and T˜ preserve coherence and
n-monotonicity.
Now consider any lower prevision P on Y that avoids sure loss. Then we can consider
its natural extension EP, and use it together with the filter map Φ to construct an induced
lower prevision P◦ := EP ◦ T˜ on G (X ×Y ):
P◦( f ) = EP( f◦) for all gambles f onX ×Y . (18)
The so-calledX -marginal P• := EP ◦T of this lower prevision is the lower prevision on
G (X ) given by
P•(g) = EP(g•) for all gambles g onX . (19)
Eqs. (18) and (19) are very closely related to, and inspired by, the expressions (10), (12),
and (14). Induced lower previsions are what results if we use the conditional information
embodied in the filter map to turn an uncertainty model about Y into an uncertainty model
about X . This is because filter maps are in a one-to-one correspondence with minitive
conditional lower previsions, taking into account the results in Sections 5 and 6.
We immediately deduce the following result:
Proposition 14. Let n ∈ N and let P be a lower prevision that avoids sure loss, and is
defined on a subset of G (Y ). Let Φ be a filter map from Y toX , and let P◦ be the lower
prevision given by Eq. (18). Then the following statements hold:
(i) P◦ is a coherent lower prevision.
(ii) If EP is n-monotone, then so is P◦.
Proof. Since EP is coherent, we infer from Proposition 11 that P◦ = EP ◦ T˜ is coherent as
well. The same result guarantees that if EP is n-monotone, then so is P◦, because T is a
∧-homomorphism by Proposition 7 and Theorem 8. 
As a particular case of the above results we have filter maps that associate with any y∈Y
a fixed filter Φ(y) of subsets ofX . If we denote by Γ(y) the smallest subset in this filter,
then we can define a multi-valued map Γ : Y →P(X ). The conditional lower prevision
P(·|Y ) associated with this filter map is precisely the one considered in [16], that we have
already discussed in Section 7.4; many of the results we establish in this section constitute
generalisations of results in [16] to arbitrary filter maps.
Remark 1. Another interesting particular case is that when Y =X and our filter map
associates, with any y ∈ Y , the filter Φ(y) of all neighbourhoods of y under a certain
topology in Y . Then the lower inverse defined in Eq. (17) produces
g•(y) = PΦ(y)(g) = sup
F∈Φ(y)
inf
z∈F
g(x) for all y in Y .
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This is called a lower oscillation model in [6], and it can be seen to model the assessment that
all the probability mass is concentrated around y. This was the idea behind the motivation
of filter maps we gave in Eq. (15).
Now, given a linear prevision pi on the class of continuous gambles over a compact metric
space, it can be proved that its natural extension to all gambles is uniquely determined by its
value on lower semi-continuous gambles, and that these are precisely the lower oscillations
defined in the above equation. This natural extension is moreover the lower envelope of the
linear extensions of the linear prevision pi to the class of gambles, and we can use the lower
oscillations to characterise those gambles for which there is a unique extension. See [6] for
more details. 
8.3. Equivalent representations. Next, let us define a prevision kernel from Y toX as
any map K from Y ×G (X ) to R such that K(y, ·) is a linear prevision on G (X ) for all
y in Y . Prevision kernels are clear generalisations of probability or Markov kernels [13,
p. 20], but without the measurability conditions. They are in a one-to-one correspondence
with separately coherent conditional linear previsions. We can extend K(y, ·) to a linear
prevision on G (X ×Y ) by letting K(y, f ) = K(y, f (·,y)) for all gambles f on X ×Y .
For any lower prevision P on Y that avoids sure loss, we denote by PK the lower prevision
on G (X ×Y ) defined by
PK( f ) = EP(K(·, f )) for all gambles f onX ×Y .
Obviously, if P is a linear prevision on G (Y ), then PK is a linear prevision on G (X ×Y ).
As an immediate consequence, PK is always a coherent lower prevision on G (X ×Y ), as
a lower envelope of linear previsions (Eq. (2)). We also use the following notation:
K(Φ) =
{
K : (∀y ∈ Y )K(y, ·) ∈M(PΦ(y))
}
(20)
= {K : (∀y ∈ Y )(∀A ∈Φ(y))K(y,A) = 1} ,
where the last equality follows from Eq. (4). The set K(Φ) can be seen as the set of
conditional linear previsions that dominate the conditional lower prevision associated with
the filter map Φ. The next proposition can be seen as a special case of Walley’s lower
envelope theorem for marginal extension [19, Theorem 6.7.4]. Our proof closely follows
Walley’s original proof.
Proposition 15. Let P be a lower prevision that avoids sure loss, and is defined on a subset
of G (Y ). Let Φ be a filter map from Y toX , and let P◦ be the lower prevision given by
Eq. (18). Then for all K ∈ K(Φ) and P ∈M(P), PK ∈M(P◦); and for all gambles f on
X ×Y there are K ∈K(Φ) and P ∈M(P) such that P◦( f ) = PK( f ).
Proof. First, fix any P in M(P) and any K ∈ K(Φ). Consider any gamble f on X ×Y .
We infer from Eqs. (16) and (20) that K(y, f )≥ f◦(y) for all y ∈ Y , and therefore PK( f ) =
P(K(·, f ))≥ P( f◦)≥ EP( f◦) = P◦( f ), where the first inequality follows from the coherence
[monotonicity] of the linear prevision P, and the second from Eq. (3). This shows that
PK ∈M(P◦).
Next, fix any gamble f on G (X ×Y ). We infer from Eqs. (2) and (20) and the coherence
of the lower previsions PΦ(y), y ∈Y [Proposition 13] that there is some K ∈K(Φ) such that
f◦ = K(·, f ). Similarly, there is some P ∈M(P) such that EP( f◦) = P( f◦), and therefore
P◦( f ) = P(K(·, f )) = PK( f ). 
The above result can be summarised by means of the following figure:
P credal set−−−−−→ M(P)
lower inverse
y ycomposition with K(Φ)
P◦
credal set−−−−−→ M(P◦)
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The above result allows us to discuss an interesting particular case of filter maps: those
associated with ultrafilters.
Definition 11. Let P(X ) denote the power set of X . A subset F of P(X ) is an
ultrafilter when it is a filter and moreover for any subset A ofX , either A or Ac belongs to
F .
Similarly to filters, ultrafilters are in a one-to-one correspondence to {0,1}-valued finitely
additive probabilities. If the corresponding filter is fixed, then there is some x ∈X such that
A ∈F if and only if x ∈ A, and the associated linear prevision corresponds to the degenerate
probability measure on x; on the other hand, if the filter is free (i.e., it has no minimal
element) then the associated probability is finitely additive but not countably additive.
Any filter of subsets of X can be obtained as the intersections of the ultrafilters that
include it [19, Theorem 3.6.6]; taking this into account, if we define
K1(Φ) := {K ∈K(Φ) : K(y,A) ∈ {0,1} ∀y ∈ Y ,A⊆X }
it is easy to establish the following:
Corollary 16. Let P be a lower prevision that avoids sure loss, and is defined on a subset
of G (Y ). Let Φ be a filter map from Y toX , and let P◦ be the lower prevision given by
Eq. (18). Then P◦ is the lower envelope of the set
{PK( f ) : P ∈M(P),K ∈K1(Φ)} .
Proof. The result follows from Proposition 15 and [19, Theorem 3.6.6], also taking into
account the one-to-one correspondence between ultrafilters that include Φ and prevision
kernels in K1(Φ). 
If we restrict our attention to theX -marginal P• of the lower prevision P◦ on G (X ×Y ),
we can go somewhat further: the following simple proposition is a considerable general-
isation of a result mentioned by Wasserman [20, Section 2.4], see also [21, Section 2].3
Here, we use the notation C
∫
f dµ for the Choquet integral of the gamble f with respect to
a functional µ ([1, 10]).
Proposition 17. Let n ∈ N and let P be a lower prevision that avoids sure loss, and is
defined on a subset of G (Y ). If EP is n-monotone, then so is P•, and moreover
P•(g) =C
∫
gdP• =C
∫
g• dEP = EP(g•) for all g ∈ G (X ). (21)
Proof. That P• is n-monotone follows at once from Proposition 14(ii), taking into account
that it is a restriction of P◦. To prove Eq. (21), it suffices to prove that the first and last
equalities hold, because of Eq. (19). To this end, use that both EP and P• are n-monotone,
and apply [18, p. 56]. 
This means that the procedures of natural extension and taking the lower inverse commute,
as we represent in the following figure:
P
lower inverse of P−−−−−−−−−→ P•
natural extension
y ynatural extension
EP
lower inverse of g−−−−−−−−−→ EP(g•) = P•(g)
Now, if the lower prevision P we start with is defined on K ⊆ G (Y ), then it is also
useful to consider the lower prevision Pr◦, defined on the set of gambles
◦K := { f ∈ G (X ×Y ) : f◦ ∈K }
3Wasserman considers the special case that P is a probability measure and that g satisfies appropriate mea-
surability conditions, so the right-most Choquet integral coincides with the usual expectation of g•. See also [15,
Theorem 14].
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as follows:
Pr◦( f ) := P( f◦) for all f such that f◦ ∈K . (22)
If P is coherent, then of course Pr◦ is the restriction of P◦ to ◦K , because then EP and
P coincide on K [see Theorem 1(iii)]. We now show that, interestingly and perhaps
surprisingly, all the ‘information’ present in P◦ is then already contained in the restricted
model Pr◦.
Proposition 18. Let P be a coherent lower prevision, defined on a set of gambles K ⊆
G (Y ). Then the following statements hold:
(i) Pr◦ is the restriction of P◦ to the set of gambles ◦K , and therefore a coherent lower
prevision on ◦K .
(ii) The natural extension EPr◦ of P
r◦ coincides with the induced lower prevision: EPr◦ =
P◦.
Proof. (i). It follows from Theorem 1(iii) that EP and P coincide onK . For any f ∈ ◦K ,
we have f◦ ∈ K and therefore P◦( f ) = EP( f◦) = P( f◦) = Pr◦( f ), also using Eqs. (18)
and (22).
(ii). Since P◦ is coherent [Proposition 14(i)] and coincides with Pr◦ on ◦K , we infer from
Theorem 1(ii) that EPr◦ ≤ P◦. Conversely, consider any gamble f onX ×Y , then we must
show that EPr◦( f )≥ P◦( f ).
Fix ε > 0. If we use the definition of natural extension [for P] in Eq. (1), we see that
there are n in N, non-negative λ1, . . . , λn in R, and gambles g1, . . . , gn inK such that
f◦(y)−P◦( f )+
ε
2
≥
n
∑
k=1
λk[gk(y)−P(gk)] for all y ∈ Y . (23)
It also follows from the definition of the lower inverse f◦ in Eq. (16) that for each y ∈ Y ,
there is some set F(y) ∈Φ(y) such that
inf
x∈F(y)
f (x,y)≥ f◦(y)− ε2 . (24)
Now define the corresponding gambles hk onX ×Y , k = 1, . . . ,n by
hk(x,y) =
{
gk(y) if y ∈ Y and x ∈ F(y)
L if y ∈ Y and x /∈ F(y),
where L is some real number strictly smaller than minnk=1 infgk, to be determined shortly.
Then for any y ∈ Y :
(hk)◦(y) = sup
F∈Φ(y)
inf
x∈F
hk(x,y) = sup
F∈Φ(y)
inf
x∈F
{
gk(y) if x ∈ F(y)
L otherwise
= sup
F∈Φ(y)
{
gk(y) if F ⊆ F(y)
L otherwise
= gk(y),
because L ≤ gk(y) and we can select F = F(y). Hence, (hk)◦ = gk ∈ K and therefore
hk ∈ ◦K and Pr◦(hk) = P(gk). This, together with Eqs. (23) and (24), allows us to infer that
f (x,y)−P◦( f )+ ε ≥
n
∑
k=1
λk[hk(x,y)−Pr◦(hk)] for all y ∈ Y and x ∈ F(y).
Moreover, by an appropriate choice of L [small enough], we can always make sure that
the inequality above holds for all (x,y) ∈X ×Y (note that once L is strictly smaller than
minnk=1 infgk decreasing it does not affect P
r◦(hk) = P(gk)). Then the definition of natural
extension [for Pr◦] in Eq. (1) guarantees that EPr◦( f )≥ P◦( f )−ε . Since this inequality holds
for any ε > 0, the proof is complete. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS
The above results show that a number of transformations considered in the literature
can all be seen as coherence preserving transformations of a possibility space, and as a
consequence they can be combined with an imprecise probability model of a certain type in
order to produce a model of the same type.
If we want to preserve n-monotonicity, which is necessary in order for a lower prevision
to have a representation by means of a Choquet integral and for it to be uniquely determined
by the restriction to events, we have seen that in a definite sense, it becomes necessary to
work with ∧-homomorphisms, which in this context imply working with minitive lower
previsions. We have proved that these minimum preserving lower previsions are in a one-to-
one correspondence with filters of events.
Our results given rise to the consideration of filter maps: maps that assign to any element
of the initial space a filter of subsets of the final space, and that are in a one-to-one corre-
spondence with conditional lower previsions that preserve n-monotonicity. We have studied
them in detail, and have shown that they possess a number of interesting properties: for
instance, they commute with other operations such as taking lower inverses and considering
the associated credal sets. In doing this, we have extended a number of results from the
literature.
As future lines of research, we would like to point out the application of coherence
preserving mappings and filter maps in decision making, as well as the investigation of their
connection with other models, such as p-boxes or (fuzzy) set-valued random variables.
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